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the use of force is not to be comtemplated, 7 where no dangerous in-
strumentality is used, and where the master is under no duty to protect
the debtor from harm.'8 The Connecticut rule seems too strict in im-
posing liability, for it makes the master liable in many case where he
properly should not be. On the other hand, the Kentucky rule will not
leave the debtor at the tender mercies of unscrupulous creditors, yet it
will protect the master from the personal wilfull acts of his servants in
situations which are often provoked by the debtor-plaintiff himself.
CHALs N. CAnNES
PUBLIC INTEREST AS A LIMITATION OF THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY
"Redress for the invasion of the right of privacy has been recog-
nized so generally in recent years that it no longer may be questioned."'
Based on the idea that each individual has a right to lead his life un-
hampered by the prying fingers of publicity, this doctrine has gained
more and more importance in the field of tort law, protecting those
whose histories, names and likenesses have been needlessly held be-
fore the public eye.
When the right of privacy was first championed in 1890 by Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, the authors proposed limitations
upon the right, the first of which was that "the right to privacy does
not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general
interest."2 This limitation is generally recognized today in jurisdic-
tions which acknowledge the right of privacy.3 Therefore, one of the
" As in the cases of guards (see cases cited supra note 12), or where agent is
put in charge of premises and is expected to maintain order or protect them. J. J.
Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309, 82 S.W. 2d 359 (1935) (Store manager);
Dennert v. Dee, 308 Ky. 687, 215 S.W. 2d 575 (1948) (bar-tender); Moore v.
Blanchard, (La. App.) 35 So. 2d 667 (1948) (bouncer.)
As in the case of a carrier, which is under a duty to protect passengers from
assaults by its servants, strangers, or fellow passengers. Gladdish v. South Eastern
Greyhound Lines, 293 Ky. 498, 169 S.W. 2d 297 (1943); Hull v. Boston & M.
R. R., 210 Mass. 159, 96 N.E. 58 (1911).
'Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W. 2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1951).
'Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAmv. L. RPv., 193, 214 (1890).
"If any (right of privacy) exists, it does not protect one from having his
name or likeness appear in a newspaper when there is a legitimate public interest
in his existence, his experiences, his words, or his acts." Themo v. New England
Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E. 2d 753, 755 (1940). See also
Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 Fed. Supp. 305 (D. C. 1948); Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp.
113 F. 2d 806 (C.C.A. 2d 1940); Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P. 2d
320 (1949); Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. 2d 133 (1945);
Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 382 (Sup. Ct. Special Term 1937);
Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
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perplexing problems now before the courts is: "What matter is privi-
leged as being in the public interest?"
Last year a United States Court of Appeals was faced with this
question in the case of Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co.4 Plaintiff, a
ten year old child, was nearly run over by an automobile due to the
carelessness of the driver. A photographer who happened to be on
band snapped a picture of a woman lifting the shaken girl to her feet,
and the following day this picture, because of its current news value
and dramatic effect, appeared in the local newspaper.
The incident appeared to be closed, but twenty months later the
defendant, Curtis Publishing Company, printed an article in the Satur-
day Evening Post emphasizing pedestrian carelessness. The article,
"They Asked To Be Killed" by David G. Wittels, was illustrated with
the plaintiff's picture beside a caption reading, "Do you invite mas-
sacre by your own carelessness? Here's how thousands have commit-
ted suicide by scorning laws that were passed to keep them alive."
Upon learning of the unauthorized use of her picture accompanying
an article foreign to the incident as it actually happened, plaintiff sued
and recovered for the wrongful invasion of her right of privacy.
The questions presented to the court were twofold: whether the
privilege involved in the original publication of plaintiff's picture had
lapsed during the interval of twenty months, and whether the use
of plaintiff's picture to illustrate a magazine article on pedestrian
carelessness instead of a news story constituted an actionable in-
vasion of her right of privacy.
Holding that the lapse of twenty months did not effect the im-
munity from liability of the original publication, the court cited the
Restatement of Torts,5 for the proposition that one who attains public
attention has relinquished part of his right to privacy and that:
"One who unwillingly comes into the public eye . . . is subject
to the same limitations upon his right to be let alone. Community
custom achieves the same result with reference to one unjustly
charged with crime or the subject of a striking catastrophe. Both
groups of persons are the objects of legitimate public interest during
a period of time after their misfortune has brought them to the public
attention; until they have reverted to the lawful and unexciting life
led by the great bulk of the community, they are subject to the privi-
leges which publishers have to satisfy the curiosity of the public as
to their leaders, heroes, villains and victims."' (Writer's italics)
If, therefore, a person who has been an object of legitimate public
interest should regain the full privilege of privacy afforded to the bulk
'192 F. 2d 974 (C.C.A. 3rd 1951).
'RESTATMMu;T, ToRTs sec. 867, Comment (c) (1939).8Ibid.
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of the community after a period of time, what then is a reasonable
period of time? Research has failed to reveal any privacy case which
turns directly on this point. However, there have been several cases
in which the time element was important. Twenty-seven years had
elapsed since a child prodigy had been a famous mathematical genius,
when a magazine carried an article exposing the intimate details of
the humdrum existence now voluntarily led by the former famous
person. Despite the intervening years, the court held that it "would
permit limited scrutiny of the 'private life' of any person who has
achieved, or has had thrust upon him, the questionable and indefinable
status of a 'public figure'."7
Yet a period of eight years was an important consideration in an
earlier California decision. This case concerned a motion picture pro-
duced by the defendant which was based on the life of the plaintiff,
a prostitute, who had been acquitted of a murder charge. During the
eight years between the trial and the production, however, the plain-
tiff had been conducting a normal and respectable life, and the court
held that the defendant's act of revealing the plaintiff's past as a prosti-
tute and an alleged murderess had violated the plaintiff's constitutional
right to freedom from unnecessary attacks on one's character.8
Two other cases involving sizeable lapses of time resulted in dis-
similar decisions. In one, the court held the plaintiff still subject to
privileged invasions of his privacy, because ten years previously he
had become widely known as a prize fighter and had thereby re-
linquished a part of his right.9 In the other the court held that the
plaintiff had a right not to be again dragged into publicity when a
radio broadcast dramatization was based on a holdup and shooting of
which the plaintiff was the victim seventeen months earlier.10
Such disparity in decisions leads to the conclusion that an absolute
rule cannot be set forth as to what is a sufficient lapse of time to do
away with the privilege of publication. What is a reasonable lapse of
time depends on the degree of importance of the news at the time it
was current. Since the time element affects the ultimate newsworthi-
ness in relation to the original degree of newsworthiness, making the
decision a judgment based upon the facts of each case, it is perhaps
more desirable that the time element be not the deciding factor in the
privacy cases, nor a question set apart, but merely an important factor
in the decision as to whether or not the right to privacy has been
invaded.
'Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. 2d 806, 809 (C.C.A. 2d 1940).
'Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
'Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P. 2d 320 (1949).
" Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Inc., 28 Fed. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
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In considering what publications are in the public interest, and
therefore immune to attack as a violation of the right of privacy,
several factors should be examined.
(1) The type of publication in which the plaintiff's name, history
or likeness appears is an important factor in ascertaining if the de-
fendant is privileged to invade the plaintiffs privacy, because the
type of publication indicates what sort of matter is contained therein.
For instance, it has been held that a person may not complain of hav-
ing his name or likeness appear in a newspaper when there is a
legitimate interest in his person and deeds." Such privileged invasion
is necessary in order to facilitate the dissemination of current news and
information of general concern.
This privilege is usually extended to magazines, whei the subject
of the article is informative or involves current events.' 2 However,
when the article is fictional, the public concern in information is no
longer involved and the defendant may then be liable for infringing
upon the plaintiffs rights.13 Thus, a Federal court recently held that a
motion picture supposedly based on the life of a public figure and
making use of the person's name was not privileged when the plot of
the story was primarily fiction.14 However, a biography of a public
figure is privileged as long as it imparts the truth concerning his
career, and unfolds nothing that would be repugnant to ones sense of
decency.15 But if a person is not a public figure, putting a true char-
acter sketch of that person in a novel may subject the author to
liability.'"
Use of the name in advertisements is an invasion of the right of
" Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E. 2d 753
(1940) (Defendant published on the front page of the newspaper, a picture of
plaintiff in conversation with a captain of police. The court held that if the right
of privacy existed in that jurisdiction, defendant had not invaded it because the
photograph was of legitimate public concern.); accord, Kelley v. Post Publishing
Co., 98 N.E. 2d 286 (Mass. 1951); Barber v. Time Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.
2d 291 (1942).
=Supra note 7; accord, Derounian v. Stokes, 168 F. 2d 305 (C.C.A. 10th
1948). Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 Fed. Supp. 957 (D.C.D.
Minn. 1948).
" Garner v. Triangle Publications Inc., 97 Fed. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(A person may not print a fictional or novelized representation of another, even if
the other is a public figure.); Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 Fed. Supp. 305 D.C.
D.C. 1948) (Plaintiff, who was not a public figure, claimed that her privacy had
been infringed when the defendant used her picture to illustrate a magazine
article without her consent.); Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162
P. 2d 133 (1945) (Publishing a photograph in connection with a magazine story
of a crime is actionable.).
" Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 194 F. 2d 6 (C.C.A. 10th 1952).
"Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S. 2d
432 (1947).
"
6 Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 S. 2d 243 (1944).
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privacy even when the subject is a prominent person. In Foster-Mil-
burn Co. v. Chinn, the court held that:
".. . the publication of the picture of a person without his consent,
as a part of an advertisement for the purpose of exploiting the pub-
lisher's business, is a violation of the right of privacy . . . It has be-
come a custom in the press to publish the picture of prominent public
men; but it is a very different thing for a manufacturer to use with-
out authority such a man's picture to advertise his goods ... "
The growing hostility of the courts toward the unauthorized use of
a name or picture in an advertisement is the result of the com-
mercialization of something the publisher has no right to use, and it
would seem that whether the person is a public figure or a private
citizen would be immaterial since in either case the publisher is hold-
ing a person before the public gaze without that person's consent and
for no purpose other than the publisher's own gain.
(2) As mentioned above, public interest usually places a limitation
upon the right to privacy when the article in which the plaintiffs name,
history or likeness appears is informative. Informative articles must,
however, be differentiated from merely instructive articles. In the case
of Almind v. Sea Beach Ry. Co.,' the defendant took the plaintiffs
picture as she was entering a railway car, and used it for advertising
purposes, i.e., to teach others the safe method of entering the cars.
The court held that: "No cause is so exalted that it may alure by ex-
posing the portrait of a person to the public gaze."19 In a similar
California case the defendant had made an unauthorized use of plain-
tiff's picture to illustrate a supposedly instructive article entitled "Love",
and there too it was held that the informative value did not justify the
use of the photograph without the plaintiff's consent. 20
The obvious difference between the articles concerned in the fore-
going cases, and those considered in the Sidisl and other similar cases
is that the articles in the foregoing cases are instructive while the lat-
ter are informative in that they impart news about the plaintiff. It is
submitted that the cases concerning instructive material have been
given too harsh treatment by the courts. It may be that few cases are
so exalted that they may allure by placing someone's picture before
the eyes of the public without his consent, especially when their use
is often wholly unnecessary as such pictures can be posed. However,
'Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (1909); ac-
cord, Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918).
157 App. Div. 230, 141 N.Y.S. 842 (1913); accord, Humiston v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 101 Misc. Rep. 3, 167 N.Y.S. 101 (1917).
"Id. at 843.
"Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 231 P. 2d 565 (Cal. 1951).
"Supra note 7,
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if no cause is deemed of sufficient worthiness, and necessity is never
to be considered, publishers could be held liable even for printing a
picture of a soldier receiving a blood transfusion on the battlefield as
an inducement for civilians to donate blood. A better solution would
be to balance the public gain against the private loss in each case.
(3) A third factor which must be considered when answering the
question "is this a matter privileged in the public interest", is whether
or not the person whose name, history or likeness has appeared in a
publication is a public figure; and if he is a public figure, then to what
degree. It cannot be denied that being involved in an automobile ac-
cident or being the victim of a felony, and other similar incidents,
casts a limited glow of public interest over a hitherto unknown person.
Yet the degree of public interest and the duration of public interest
in such a person is obviously less than that which surrounds an im-
portant political figure, a famous scientist, a notorious criminal, or
other like individuals. It has been said that:
"The determining factor is the content and character of the publi-
cation, not the standing of the individual. Even the most famous
have a right to be protected against unauthorized use of their names
and photographs in a manner not connected with their public life."'
Certainly a famous person should be protected from invasions of
his privacy which are not connected with his public life. Therefore, it
is true that one determining factor is the content of the publication.
Yet, in order to differentiate those subjects connected with public life
from those having no such connection, a consideration of the degree of
importance attributable to prominent persons seems essential. Today,
through the medium of the press, the public is made familiar with the
intimate details of prominent figures' private lives even though the
details are not connected with their public capacity. The publication
of such personal habits would undoubtedly be an invasion of privacy,
were the person not a prominent figure. Furthermore, as to the dura-
tion of the interest, an article about a famous general would, no doubt,
be of interest, and thereby privileged many years after he had retired
from active service, while the interest span of an article concerning a
victim of an automobile accident would be comparatively short.
Thus, not only the subject matter of the article but the notoriety
of the individual as a prominent public figure is pertinent to the prob-
lem at hand. The degree of prominence must necessarily be deter-
mined as a question of fact. As the court said in the Donahue case,
"The question whether a person is a public figure . . . may rest upon
" Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MicH. L. Rm'. 526 (1940-41), con-
struing Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909).
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various and variable facts and circumstances. And no rule of thumb
has been evolved for its easy solution in all cases."23
(4) One of the purposes behind adopting the doctrine of the
right to privacy is to protect the individual from unauthorized publica-
tions of his name, history or likeness which would affect his relations
with third persons.2 4 Of course, all publications concerning living
people effect their relationships with the public in some way. There-
fore, a consideration which could be used to facilitate the determina-
tion of whether or not there has been an invasion of an individual's
right to privacy by an unprivileged use is whether the publication
affects the person's relationships with others in such a way as to be
expected to wound a reasonable person's sensibilities.
In cases of legitimate public interest, wounded sensibilities will not
subject the publisher to liability.25 However, in a close case such as
Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,26 the effect of the publication upon the
plaintiff's relationships with third persons might well be examined. In
the Gill case, the defendant published a picture of plaintiff and his
wife in a romantic pose. The plaintiff, in bringing this action for the
invasion of his privacy, did not allege that offensive implications arose
from the use of the picture, although he did allege humiliation and
annoyance. The court found that the use did not go beyond the limits
of decency, and denied recovery. It has been said that there are few
limits upon the right to take pictures; the limitations concern the use
to which the photographs are put.27 Justice Wilson dissented, saying
that any publication of a picture of an individual, taken surreptitiously
and published without his consent should be deemed an intrusion of
that person's privacy.28
Unquestionably, printing a picture of an individual which has been
taken surreptitiously may well have unpleasant effects upon that in-
dividual's relations with third persons. The law should extend its pro-
tection to this and similar cases. The factor of the invasion's effect on
third persons is the important consideration in this extension of the
rule.
One of the original arguments for adopting the doctrine of the
right of privacy was that the press was overstepping the bounds of
decency.29 Whether the person involved in the publication in question
' Supra note 14 at 13.
' Leon Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REv. 237, 244 (1932).
' Wilfred Feinberg, Recent Developments In The Law of Privacy, 48 COL. L.
REV. 713 (1948).
Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 231 P. 2d 570 (Cal. 1951).
'
T Supra note 24.
Supra note 26.
" Supra note 2 at 196.
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be a public figure, a private individual or a child; whether the subject
of the publication be connected with his public life, his private life,
or not in truth connected with his life at all; still, there are some topics
presented in certain manners which will offend not only the sensi-
bilities of the individual, but the sense of decency of the community as
a whole. Print the story of an accident, a crime, an election, and the
courts nod their approval; but print an unauthorized picture of a
woman suffering from a strange disease,30 or the picture of a dead,
malformed child,31 and the courts uphold the protestations of the in-
jured parties. Again the degree of public interest must be balanced
against the effect of the publication on the sensibilities of the in-
dividual.
In conclusion, public interest must necessarily place a limitation
on the right to privacy so that information of general concern, and for
general knowledge and benefit may be put before the public. In
determining whether the subject matter is of public interest and there-
by privileged, factors which should be considered include the nature
of the publication, the informative or instructive value of the article,
the degree of public prominence which had heretofore been attained
by the plaintiff, and the effect the publication will have upon the
plaintiff's relations with third persons. In addition, publishers may
not go beyond the limits of decency in their efforts to inform and
interest, thereby subjecting public or private persons to unwarranted
publicity.
DiANm LouisE McKAm
" Barber v. Time Inc., 438 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942).
" Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
